Secret sharing is a cryptographic discipline in which the goal is to distribute information about a secret over a set of participants in such a way that only specific authorized combinations of participants together can reconstruct the secret. Thus, secret sharing schemes are systems of variables in which it is very clearly specified which subsets have information about the secret. As such, they provide perfect model systems for information decompositions. However, following this intuition too far leads to an information decomposition with negative partial information terms, which are difficult to interpret. One possible explanation is that the partial information lattice proposed by Williams and Beer is incomplete and has to be extended to incorporate terms corresponding to higher order redundancy. These results put bounds on information decompositions that follow the partial information framework, and they hint at where the partial information lattice needs to be improved.
Introduction
Williams and Beer (2010) have proposed a general framework to decompose the multivariate mutual information I(S; X 1 , . . . , X n ) between a target random variable S and predictor random variables X 1 , . . . , X n into different terms (called partial information terms) according to different ways in which combinations of the variables X 1 , . . . , X n provide unique, shared or synergistic information about S. Williams and Beer argue that such a decomposition can be based on a measure of shared information. The underlying idea is that any information can be classified according to "who knows what." But is this true?
A situation where the question "who knows what" is easy to answer very precisely is secret sharing, a part of cryptography in which the goal is to distribute information (the secret) over a set of participants such that the secret can only be reconstructed if certain authorized combinations of the participants join their information (see Beimel (2011) for a survey). The set of authorized combinations is called the access structure. Formally, the secret is modelled as a random variable S, and a secret sharing scheme assigns a random variable X i to each participant i in such a way that, if {i 1 , . . . , i k } is an authorized set of participants, then S is a function of X i1 , . . . , X i k ; that is, H(S|X i1 , . . . , X i k ) = 0; and, conversely, if {i 1 , . . . , i k } is not authorized, then H(S|X i1 , . . . , X i k ) > 0. It is assumed that the participants know the scheme, and so any authorized combination of participants can reconstruct the secret if they join their information. A secret sharing scheme is perfect if non-authorized sets of participants know nothing about the secret; i.e., H(S|X i1 , . . . , X i k ) = H(S). Thus, in a perfect secret sharing scheme, it is very clearly specified "who knows what." In this sense, perfect secret sharing schemes provide model systems for which it should be easy to write down an information decomposition.
One connection between secret sharing and information decompositions is that the set of access structures of secret sharing schemes with n participants is in one-to-one correspondence with the partial information terms of Williams and Beer. This correspondence makes it possible to give an intuitive interpretation to all partial information terms: Namely, the partial information term is a measure of how similar a given system of random variables is to a secret sharing scheme with a given access structure.
This correspondence also allows to introduce the secret sharing property that makes precise the above intuition: An information decomposition satisfies this property if and only if any perfect secret sharing scheme has just a single partial information term (which corresponds to its access structure). As shown in Proposition 1, in an information decomposition that satisfies a natural generalization of this property, it is possible to prescribe arbitrary nonnegative values to all partial information terms.
These results suggest that perfect secret sharing schemes fit well together with the ideas of Williams and Beer. However, following this intuition too far leads to inconsistencies. As Theorem 4 shows, extending the secret sharing property to pairs of perfect secret sharing schemes leads to negative partial information terms. While other authors have started to build an intuition for negative partial terms and argue that they may be unavoidable in information decompositions, this paper collects arguments against such claims and discusses other possible solutions.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows: Section 2 summarizes definitions and results about secret sharing schemes. Section 3 introduces different secret sharing properties that fix the values that a measure of shared information assigns to perfect secret sharing schemes and combinations thereof. The main result of Section 4 is that the pairwise secret sharing property leads to negative partial information terms. Section 5 discusses the implications of this incompatibility result.
Perfect secret sharing schemes
We consider n participants among whom we want to distribute information about a secret in such a way that we can control which subsets of participants together can decrypt the secret. Definition 1. An access structure A is a family of subsets of {1, . . . , n}, closed to taking supersets. Elements of A are called authorized sets.
A secret sharing scheme with access structure A is a family of random variables S, X 1 , . . . , X n such that:
The condition for perfection is equivalent to H(S|X A ) = H(S). See Beimel (2011) for a survey on secret sharing.
Theorem 1. For any access structure A and any h > 0, there exists a perfect secret sharing scheme with access structure A for which the entropy of the secret S equals H(S) = h.
Proof. Perfect secret sharing schemes for arbitrary access structures were first constructed by Ito et al. (1987) . In this construction, the entropy of the secret equals 1 bit. Combining n copies of such a secret sharing scheme gives a secret sharing scheme with a secret of n bit. As explained in (Beimel, 2011, Claim 1) , the distribution of the secret may be perturbed arbitrarily (as long as the support of the distribution remains the same). In this way it is possible to prescribe the entropy of the secret in a perfect secret sharing scheme.
S be independent uniform binary random variables, and let
where ⊕ denotes addition modulo 2 (or the XOR operation). Then (S, A, B, C) is a perfect secret sharing scheme with access structure
It may be of little surprise that integer addition modulo k is an important building block in many secret sharing schemes.
While existence of perfect secret sharing schemes is solved, there remains the problem of finding efficient secret sharing schemes in the sense that the variables X 1 , . . . , X n should be as small as possible (in the sense of a small entropy), given a fixed entropy of the secret. For instance, in Example 1, H(X i )/H(S) = 2 for all i. See Beimel (2011) for a survey.
Since an access structure A is closed to taking supersets, it is uniquely determined by its inclusion-minimal elements
For instance, in Example 1, the first three elements belong to A. The set A has the property that no element of A is a subset of another element of A. Such a collection of sets is called an antichain. Conversely, any such antichain equals the set of inclusion-minimal elements of a unique access structure. The antichains have a natural lattice structure, which was used by Williams and Beer to order the different values of shared information and organize them into what they call the partial information lattice. The same lattice also has a description in terms of secret sharing.
Definition 2. Let (A 1 , . . . , A k ) and (B 1 , . . . , B l ) be antichains. Then
The partial information lattice for the case n = 3 is depicted in Figure 1 .
Lemma 1. Let A be an access structure on {1, . . . , n}, and let (B 1 , . . . , B l ) be an antichain. Then B 1 , . . . , B l are all authorized for A if and only if A (B 1 , . . . , B l ).
Proof. The statement directly follows from the definitions.
Information decompositions of secret sharing schemes
Williams and Beer (2010) proposed to decompose the total mutual information I(S; X 1 , . . . , X n ) between a target random variable S and predictor random variables X 1 , . . . , X n according to different ways in which combinations of the variables X 1 , . . . , X n provide unique, shared or synergistic information about S. One of their main ideas is to base such a decomposition on a single measure of shared information I ∩ , which is a function I(S; Y 1 , . . . , Y k ) that takes as arguments a list of random variables, of which the first, S, takes a special role. To arrive at a decomposition of I(S; X 1 , . . . , X n ), the variables Y 1 , . . . , Y k are taken to be combinations X A = (X i ) i∈A of X 1 , . . . , X n , corresponding to subsets A of {1, . . . , n}. For simplicity,
Williams and Beer proposed a list of axioms that such a measure I ∩ should satisfy. It follows from these axioms that it suffices to consider the function I ∩ (S; A 1 , . . . , A k ) in the case that (A 1 , . . . , A k ) is an antichain. Moreover, I ∩ (S; ·) is a monotone function on the partial information lattice (Definition 2). Thus it is natural to write each value I ∩ (S; A 1 , . . . , A k ) on the lattice as a sum of local terms I ∂ corresponding to the antichains that lie below (A 1 , . . . , A k ) in the lattice:
The terms I ∂ are called partial information terms. This representation always exists, and the partial information terms are uniquely defined (using a Mbius inversion). However, it is not guaranteed that I ∂ is always nonnegative. If I ∂ is nonnegative, then I ∩ is called locally positive.
Williams and Beer also defined a function denoted by I min that satisfies their axioms and that is locally positive. While the framework is intriguing and has attracted a lot of further research (as this special issue illustrates), the function I min has been critiziced as not measuring the right thing. The difficulty of finding a reasonable measure of shared information that is locally positive Bertschinger et al. (2013) ; Rauh et al. (2014) has led some to argue that maybe local positivity is not a necessary requirement for an information decomposition. This issue is discussed further in the discussion in Section 5.
The goal of this section is to present additional natural properties for a measure of shared information that relate secret sharing with the intuition behind information decompositions. In a perfect secret sharing scheme, any combination of participants knows either nothing or everything about S. This motivates the following definition:
Definition 3. A measure of shared information I ∩ has the secret sharing property if and only if for any access structure A and any perfect secret sharing scheme (X 1 , . . . , X n , S) with access structure A, the following holds:
. . , A k are all authorized, 0, otherwise, for any A 1 , . . . , A k ⊆ {X 1 , . . . , X n }.
Assuming the secret sharing property, perfect secret sharing schemes lead to information decompositions with a single nonzero partial information term:
Lemma 2. If I ∩ has the secret sharing property and if (X 1 , . . . , X n , S) is a perfect secret sharing scheme with access structure A, then
Definition 4. Let A 1 , . . . , A l be access structures on {1, . . . , n}. A combination of (perfect) secret sharing schemes with access structures A 1 , . . . , A l consists of random variables S 1 , . . . , S l , X 1 , . . . , X n such that (S i , X 1 , . . . , X n ) is a (perfect) secret sharing scheme with access structure A i for i = 1, . . . , l. A combination of (perfect) secret sharing schemes is independent, if the secrets S 1 , . . . , S l are independent.
In this definition, if two access structures A i , A j are identical, then we can replace S i and S j by a single random variable and obtain a combination of (perfect) secret sharing schemes with less access structures. Otherwise, if A i = A j , then S i and S j are independent:
Lemma 3. If S 1 , . . . , S l , X 1 , . . . , X n is a combination of (perfect) secret sharing schemes with pairwise different access structures A 1 , . . . , A l , then the variables S 1 , . . . , S k are pairwise independent.
However, S 1 , . . . , S k need not be independent. The proof of Theorem 2 below contains an example.
Proof. Let i = j ∈ {1, . . . , l}. By assumption, A i = A j . Without loss of generality, assume that A i ⊆ A j . Then there exists A ∈ A i \ A j . Then
In a combination of perfect secret sharing schemes, it is very clear who knows what: Namely, a group of participants knows all secrets for which it is authorized, while it knows nothing about the remaining secrets. This motivates the following definition:
Definition 5. A measure of shared information I ∩ has the combined secret sharing property if and only if for any combination of perfect secret sharing schemes with access structures A 1 , . . . , A l ,
(the entropy of those secrets for which A 1 , . . . , A k are all authorized). I ∩ has the independent secret sharing property if and only if the same holds true in the special case that S 1 , . . . , S l are independent. I ∩ has the pairwise secret sharing property if and only if the same holds true in the special case l = 2.
By Lemma 3, the pairwise secret sharing property implies the independent secret sharing property.
Combinations of l perfect secret sharing schemes lead to information decompositions with at most l nonzero partial information terms, at least if the S i are independent. Later, we will mostly be interested in the case l = 2, for which independence follows from Lemma 3.
Lemma 4. Assume that I ∩ has the independent secret sharing property. If (S 1 , . . . , S l , X 1 , . . . , X n ) is a combination of perfect secret sharing schemes with pairwise different access structures A 1 , . . . , A k and with S 1 , . . . , S l independent, then
for any A 1 , . . . , A k ⊆ {X 1 , . . . , X n }.
The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 2 and omitted. The independent secret sharing property implies that any combination of nonnegative values can be prescribed as partial information values.
Proposition 1. Suppose that a nonnegative number p A is given for any antichain A.
For any measure of shared information that satisfies the independent secret sharing property, there exist random variables S, X 1 , . . . , X n such that the corresponding partial measure I ∂ satisfies I ∂ (S; A 1 , . . . , A k ) = p A1,...,A k for all antichains A = (A 1 , . . . , A k ).
Proof. By Theorem 1, for each antichain A there exists a perfect secret sharing scheme S A , X 1,A , . . . , X n,A with H(S A ) = p A . Combine independent copies of these perfect secret sharing schemes and let
where A runs over all antichains. Then S, X 1 , . . . , X n is an independent combination of perfect secret sharing schemes, and the statement follows from Lemma 4.
Unfortunately, not every random variable S can be decomposed in such a way as a combination of secret sharing schemes. However, given a measure I ∩ of shared information that satisfies the combined secret sharing property, we can interpret I ∂ (S; A) as a measure that quantifies how much (X 1 , . . . , X n , S) looks like a perfect secret sharing scheme with access structure A.
Lemma 5. Suppose that I ∩ is a measure of shared information that satisfies the pairwise secret sharing property. If X 1 and X 2 are independent, then I ∩ (X 1 , X 2 ); X 1 , X 2 = 0.
In the language of Ince (2016) , the lemma says that the pairwise secret sharing property implies the "independent identity property."
Proof. Let S 1 = X 1 , S 2 = X 2 . Then S 1 , S 2 , X 1 , X 2 is a pair of perfect secret sharing schemes with access structures A 1 = {1} and A 2 = {2} . The statement follows from Definition 5, since X 1 is not authorized for A 2 and X 2 is not authorized for A 1 .
Incompatibility with local positivity
Unfortunately, although the combined secret sharing property very much fits the intuition behind the axioms of Williams and Beer, it is incompatible with a nonnegative decomposition according to the partial information lattice:
Theorem 2. Let I ∩ be a measure of shared information that satisfies the Williams-Beer axioms and has the pairwise secret sharing property. Then I ∂ is not nonnegative.
Proof. The XOR example, which was already used in Bertschinger et al. (2013) ; Rauh et al. (2014) to prove incompatibility results for properties of information decompositions, can also be used here.
Let X 1 , X 2 be independent binary uniform random variables, let X 3 = X 1 ⊕ X 2 , and let S = (X 1 , X 2 , X 3 ). The following values of I ∩ can be computed from the assumptions:
• I ∩ S; X 1 , (X 2 X 3 ) = I ∩ S; X 1 , (X 1 X 2 X 3 ) = I ∩ (S; X 1 ) = 1 bit, since X 1 is a function of (X 2 , X 3 ) and by the monotonicity axiom. • I ∩ (S; X 1 , X 2 ) = I ∩ (X 1 X 2 X 3 ); X 1 , X 2 = I ∩ (X 1 X 2 ); X 1 , X 2 = 0 by Lemma 5. Figure 1 . The partial information lattice for n = 3. Each node is indexed by an antichain. The values (in bit) of the shared information in the XOR example from the proof of Theorem 2 according to the pairwise secret sharing property are given after the colon.
By monotonicity, I ∩ (S; X 1 , X 2 , X 3 ) = 0. Moreover,
since 2 bit is the total entropy in the system. But then
where ±0 denotes values of I ∩ that vanish. Thus, I ∂ is not nonnegative.
Note that the random variables (S = (X 1 , X 2 , X 3 ), X 1 , X 2 , X 3 ) from the proof of Theorem 2 form a combination of three perfect secret sharing schemes. The three secrets X 1 , X 2 , X 3 are not independent, but they are pair-wise independent (and so Lemma 4 does not apply).
Remark 1. The XOR example from the proof of Theorem 2 (which was already featured in Bertschinger et al. (2013) ; Rauh et al. (2014) ) was criticized in Chicharro and Panzeri (2017) on the grounds that it involves random variables that stand in a deterministic functional relation (in the sense that X 3 = X 1 ⊕ X 2 ). Chicharro and Panzeri argue that in such a case it is not appropriate to use the full partial information lattice. Instead, the functional relationship should be used to eliminate (or identify) nodes from the lattice. Thus, while the monotonicity axiom of Williams and Beer implies I ∩ (S; X 3 , (X 2 , X 3 )) = I ∩ (S; X 3 ) (and so {3; 23} is not part of the partial information lattice), the same axiom also implies that I ∩ (S; X 3 , (X 1 , X 2 )) = I ∩ (S; X 3 ), and so {3; 12} should similarly be excluded from the lattice. But note that the first argument is a formal argument that is valid for all joint distributions of S, X 1 , X 2 , X 3 , while the second argument takes into account the particular underlying distribution.
It is easy to work around this objection. The deterministic relationship disappears when an arbitrarily small stochastic noise is added to the joint distribution. Assuming that the partial information terms depend continuously on this joint distribution, the partial information term I ∂ (S; (X 1 X 2 ), (X 1 X 3 ), (X 2 X 3 )) will still be negative. Thus, assuming continuity, the conclusion of Theorem 2 still holds true when the information decomposition according to the full partial information lattice is only considered for random variables that do not satisfy any functional deterministic constraint.
Discussion
We have seen that perfect secret sharing schemes correspond to systems of random variables in which it is very clearly specified "who knows what." In such a system, it is easy to assign intuitive values to the shared information nodes in the partial information lattice, and one may conjecture that the intuition behind this assignment is the same intuition that underlies the Williams and Beer axioms, which define the partial information lattice. Moreover, following the same intuition, independent combinations of perfect secret sharing schemes can be used as a tool to construct systems of random variables with prescribable (nonnegative) values of partial information.
Unfortunately, this extension to independent combinations of perfect secret sharing schemes is not without problems: By Theorem 2, it leads to decompositions with negative partial information terms. But what does it mean that the examples derived from the same intuition as the Williams and Beer axioms contradict the same axioms in this way? Is this an indication that the whole idea of information decomposition does not work?
There are several ways out of this dilemma. The first solution (which will not be pursued further in this text) is to assign different values to combinations of perfect secret sharing schemes.
The second solution is to accept negative partial values in the information decomposition. It has been argued Ince (2016); Wibral et al. (2015) that negative values of information can be given an intuitive interpretation in terms of confusing information. Sometimes, this phenomenon is wrongly called "misinformation." However, in colloquial language at least, misinformation refers to wrong and misleading information that is usually spread on purpose. But random variables don't lie, even if their outcomes are sometimes confusing. If the outcome of a poll before an election suggests that a certain candidate will win, but after the election it becomes clear that another candidate has won, this can lead to great uncertainties in people's beliefs about the future. Still, neither the election result nor the poll result carries misinformation (unless, maybe, the poll result has been manipulated). In any case, allowing negative partial values alters the interpretation of an information decomposition to a point where it is questionable whether the word "decomposition" is still appropriate.
A third solution is to change the underlying lattice structure of the decomposition. A first step in this direction was done by Chicharro and Panzeri (2017) who propose to decompose mutual information according to subsets of the partial information lattice. However, it is also conceivable that the lattice has to be enlarged.
Williams and Beer derived the partial information lattice from their axioms together with the assumption that everything can be expressed in terms of shared information (that is, according to "who knows what"). Shared information is sometimes equivalently called redundant information, but it may be necessary to distinguish the two. Information that is shared by several random variables is information that is accessible to each single random variable, but redundancy can also arise at higher orders. An example is the infamous XOR example from the proof of Theorem 2: In this example, each pair X i , X j is independent, but the total system X 1 , X 2 , X 3 has only three bits. Therefore, there is one bit of redundancy. However, this redundancy bit is not located anywhere specifically. This phenomenon corresponds to the fact that random variables can be pairwise independent without being independent. This kind of higher order redundancy does not have a place in the partial information lattice. When the lattice is enlarged by adding further nodes corresponding to higher order redundancy, the structure of the Mbius inversion is changed, and it is possible that the resulting lattice leads to nonnegative partial information terms, without changing those cumulative information values that are already present in the original lattice. The analysis of extensions of the partial information lattice is scope for future work.
